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1.Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is in depth to examine the Scandinavians’ attitudes towards pay in a com-
parative perspective. Do they stand out from those inhabited by people in other western countries, 
and in that case in which way? 
The Scandinavian countries are internationally renowned for consistently having maintained a high 
degree of economic equality. As such the Scandinavian countries consistently demonstrate net Gini-
coefficients below 0.3, which by comparative standards are very low figures (www.stats.oecd.org). 
There are two mains reasons for this. Firstly the unique social democratic/universal Scandinavian 
welfare state has a well-described ability through an extensive proportional income tax regime and 
lavish income transfers to secure a high degree of net-income equality (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Esping-Andersen 1999; Christiansen 2007; Larsen 2008; Ervasti et al 2008 and Fridberg & Kangas 
2008).     
The welfare state is not the only factor behind the very low net Gini-coefficients. The Scandinavian 
countries’ gross Gini-coefficients are just above 0.4, which of course is well above the net-
coefficient, but still low compared to other OECD-countries (www.stats.oecd.org). The cause of the 
Scandinavian equality is thus not just the well-known redistributive effect of the welfare state, but 
also a quite compressed distribution of gross incomes. Attitudes towards redistribution and the wel-
fare state especially among Scandinavians are by now well-developed research disciplines1. In con-
trast to this it remains to be investigated how the Scandinavians relate to the incomes paid to differ-
ent occupations on the labour market. The purpose of this paper is trying to fill out this knowledge 
gap.  
The next section will dive into the context of attitudes towards pay. This means a presentation and 
discussion of different theoretical perspectives on how to perceive pay. These perspectives are 
mainly general perspectives, but a Scandinavian focus will be maintained. Hereafter a methodologi-
cal section will discuss how to measure attitudes towards pay. This section includes both a review 
and discussion of existing research on the subject as well as methodological considerations about 
the concept. The section ends up identifying four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards pay, 
                                                 
1 See Larsen (2006) pp. 34-37 for a review of the literature. 
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which in four separate sections will be operationalised and analysed. A conclusion will in the end 
sum up and discuss the findings.  
The article is mainly explorative in its nature, while several of the operationalised dimensions of 
attitudes towards pay, are identified for the first time in this research field. As such no testable hy-
pothesis will be presented regarding the Scandinavian attitudes towards pay. The purpose of the 
article is instead to identify and describe the multifaceted concept of the Scandinavian attitudes to-
wards pay in a two-way comparative perspective – across time and space. 
 
2. The context of attitudes towards pay– as-
sumptions and possible consequences for the 
Scandinavians 
“Who gets what, when and how”, this classic definition of politics by Lasswell (1936) indicates that 
the distribution of income and therefore the question of pay is one of the most fundamental ques-
tions in the social sciences with a long theoretical history connected.  
Already in classical Marxism the question of income and which pay the workers earn on the market 
was central. It’s argued that the objective materialistic conditions developing in the capitalist socie-
ty in time will spur the formation of class-consciousness among the working class (the proletariat). 
More specifically this means a steadily worsening economic cleavage between the increasingly 
fewer and richer capitalists (the bourgeoisie), who owns the means of production, and the increas-
ingly impoverished working class. Preventing the formation of class-consciousness the superstruc-
ture of the capitalist society – that is state, culture, institutions and rituals – will reflect the interests 
of the ruling capitalist class and provide the workers with a “false consciousness”. This will prevent 
the working class from realising their true objective economic interests until class-consciousness is 
achieved (Marx 1972; Marx & Engels 1968). 
The Marxist theory of wages does not normatively answer the question of how big the workers’ 
salaries should be to be considered fair. Instead it just predicts that the competition on the labour 
market will imply that the salaries of the workers in time will be as low as on the minimum subsist-
ence level of people (Marx 1972; Marx & Engels 1968). Subscribing to this analysis, it is obvious 
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that the salaries, workers will be able to earn if wage-determination is left solely to the market, easi-
ly could be seen as unfair. The non-revolutionary trade unions of the western countries historically 
found a solution of how to insure more fair wages of workers, without having to resort to revolu-
tion: By sticking together and organising in trade unions the workers were able to offset the unequal 
balance of power towards the capitalists, to get more bargaining power and contribute to securing 
higher and in their views more fair salaries for the workers (Gyes, Witte & Pasture 2001 and Adison 
& Schnabel 2003). 
The narrative above implies that referring just to value on a free wage-market is not enough for de-
termining fair wages. But, the narrative does not indicate, at which level a salary of a given worker2 
should be in order to be judged fair, nor does it specify on which background, or on the basis of 
which criteria, such an evaluation should be made. Furthermore it is left unanswered, what actually 
influences the views, people have on these issues. Could they actually be expected to sign up for the 
fight for higher salaries, or are they too influenced by the exposure to the superstructure and the 
values of the ruling capitalist class?  
Åberg (1984) can be used to clarify some of these questions. He makes hypotheses about how and 
under which circumstances trade unions can influence the attitudes among their members and oth-
ers, about what a fair wage for a given wage-earner actually is. Åberg (1984) argues that when the 
trade union-movement in a country moves to become almost completely centralised, a shift in point 
of reference in evaluating, what constitutes a fair salary, is made3. When a certain group of wage-
earners puts forward demands about pay-increases, this demand no longer just needs to be justified 
towards the employers, but also towards other wage-earner groups. The wage-earner groups now 
need more neutral criteria, than value and maybe collective strength on the wage-market, to deter-
mine what constitutes a fair salary for a specific wage-earner group. This implies a shift towards 
certain “non-market criteria”4 for making this evaluation. A consequence is that a group of wage-
earners cannot legitimise demands of larger relative wage-raises than other groups, if this demand is 
not substantiated in “non-market criteria” arguments seen legitimate by other wage-earner groups. 
According to Åberg (1984) the consequence is that it becomes hard to legitimise both very high and 
                                                 
2 The more neutral concept of wage-earner will be used from now on. 
3 Åberg’s (1984) example is the Swedish trade union-movement in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
4 According to Åberg (1984) these include a company’s financial capabilities in giving pay-raises, the situation of the 
company on the market and future developments, the nature of the work, how dangerous it is and how big an education-
al level certain groups of workers have. 
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very low relative salaries for certain wage-earner groups. Attitudinally the result is therefore hostili-
ty towards big wage dispersion. 
The Scandinavian countries have traditionally been characterised by having uniquely centralised 
trade union-movements (Card et al 2003; Flanagan 2003; Visser 2003 and Svallfors 2004). Follow-
ing Åberg (1984) it could be assumed that the Scandinavians could have been influenced by this 
unique centralised structure towards having more egalitarian views, on what constitutes fair salaries 
and differences in salaries, than the case was in other western countries. Furthermore this individual 
evaluation could also be assumed to a higher extent to have been based on “non-market criteria”, 
than the case was in other western countries. 
The Scandinavian labour markets and trade union-movements have changed somewhat since the 
1980’s, which formed the context of Åberg’s (1984) research. The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian 
trade union-movements’ central organisations have abolished the centralised wage-negotiations. At 
first these were replaced by separate collective bargaining negotiations for each trade union. Gradu-
ally it also became possible to supplement the general terms of the collective agreements with indi-
vidual negotiations with the employer. For some wage-earner groups this individual negotiation 
form has clearly superseded the collective bargaining in being the main determinant for the salary 
of the individual employee (Flanagan 2003; Visser 2003 and Svallfors 2004). The trade union den-
sity rates in all three Scandinavian countries have also exhibited a clear and constant declining ten-
dency since Åberg’s (1984) descriptions (Visser 2003 and www.oecd.org). 
Following Åberg’s (1984) logic, this should weaken the Scandinavian trade union’s discursive, 
structural and socialisational power. Therefore the egalitarian values among the Scandinavians and 
the subscription to “non-market criteria” for evaluating, what constitutes fair salaries, should be 
weakened. Paraphrasing the Marxist terminology one could state that the workers are now again 
fully exposed to the superstructure and the values of the ruling capitalist class, without having a 
strong discursive opponent in the form of a centralised trade union-movement.  
Furthermore it is often argued that globalisation induces a convergence towards market-conform 
attitudes and values across the nations of this earth (Osberg & Smeeding 2006). These two tenden-
cies taken into account suggest that attitudes towards pay of the modern Scandinavians are probably 
not anymore particularly egalitarian, nor are they guided by “non-market criteria” in this evaluation. 
Instead they could be assumed, to at least some extent, embrace the notion that the salary paid on 
the market per definition is just. 
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A very different narrative than the above described, rooted in laissez faire capitalism and neo-
classical economic, would claim just that. The invisible hand of the market will thus automatically 
insure equilibrium between the demand and supply of workforce. The competition on the labour 
market will therefore insure that the wage-earners always will get the salary they deserve. This is 
because a fair salary in this narrative is defined by the individual worker’s productivity or worth on 
the market.  Some wage-earner’s productivity is higher than others, and it can often be increased by 
upgrading skills or getting further education. The differences in productivity between the wage-
earners thus explain both why differences in wages exist, and why they should exist. Furthermore 
because the free market always is the most efficient allocation-mechanism securing a pareto-
optimal condition, any attempts to interfere or regulate will lead to a loss of welfare not benefitting 
anyone. Strong trade unions can thus also be seen as harmful in this narrative (Esping-Andersen 
1990, 41-44 and Kerr 2011). 
The subject of this paper is to investigate how attitudes towards pay of the present day Scandinavi-
ans stand in this intersection of narratives. Do the Scandinavians still have exceptionally egalitarian 
attitudes towards pay in a comparative perspective as Åberg (1984) suggested in the 1980’s. Or 
have declining trade union density rates and the decentralisation of the collective bargaining sys-
tems since the 1980’s led to an erosion of egalitarian attitudes? Is the combined effect of the global-
isation, individualisation and the weakened trade union-movement such that the attitudes towards 
pay of the present day Scandinavians do not stand out in western comparisons? And if they still 
stand out, in which way is this, and what does it tell us? 
3. How to measure attitudes towards pay – 
methodological issues and dimensions 
In deciding how to measure the concept of attitudes towards pay two considerations are important. 
Firstly this paper subscribes to the principle of comparison. A comparative perspective helps to 
avoid ethnocentrically biased research. This could either be to think something national specific is 
actually just a general trend or to think something general is actually national specific (Svallfors 
1995). Put plainly comparison helps us to know what is high and low, what constitutes a significant 
change and what not. It has therefore been found important to compare the attitudes of the Scandi-
navians to those inhabited by people in a range of other western countries.  
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Secondly attitudes towards pay is a rather broad topic to investigate. As it will be clear below, this 
concept is multidimensional, and for at least one of the dimensions several possibilities exist of how 
to measure the dimension. The actual measure or measures chosen must therefore be able to en-
compass these different dimensions.  
Fortunately such a measure actually exists in the Social Inequality modules (I-IV) of the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted in 1987, 1992, 1999 and 2009. ISSP is one of 
the biggest international comparative survey-projects existing. It nowadays compromises 47 coun-
tries (including the Scandinavian countries) (www.issp.org). The measure is the survey question: 
“What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get…?”, 
and the question is posed for a number of different occupations5.  
In the sections below it will firstly be discussed, how the measure has been used in existing re-
search. It is argued that the existing research is not using the potential of this measure fully, while 
the focus exclusively is on the dimension of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay. It will 
secondly be discussed if another measure is better in tapping this dimension and what actually are 
the advantages and disadvantages of the measure used in the article. Finally a section defining and 
operationalising four distinct dimensions of attitudes towards pay will be presented.   
 
3.1 Existing research – a narrow focus on the difference in levels of pay 
dimension, not utilising the potential of the measure 
Existing research using the above mentioned measure can be subscribed to a by now pretty diversi-
fied and well-establish research field in “Social Justice Beliefs”6. A good indication of this is that 
both the mentioned Social Inequality modules of ISSP, but also “The international Social Justice 
Project”, were dedicated to investigate the attitudes to social justice (Kluegel et al 1995 and Larsen 
                                                 
5In Social Inequality module I and II from 1987 and 1992 the question was posed to eleven different occupations that 
varied marginally between the modules. In the third module from 1999 the number of occupations was reduced to nine. 
In the recent fourth module from 2009 the number of professions was further reduced to five (www.issp.org and Osberg 
& Smeeding 2006, 459). 
6 One possible reason for this is that questions about social justice always have been one of the core themes in political 
philosophy and theory. The literature about social justice is therefore very wide and encompasses not only empirical 
investigations about people’s beliefs, but also a wide normative literature (Kluegel et al 1995; Larsen 2006 and Miller 
1995). 
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2006). “Social Justice Beliefs” are not just attitudes towards pay though. A wide range of dependent 
variables have been in focus within this research field7.  
When the focus is narrowed down to encompass only the research actually using the above men-
tioned measure, the field is more limited (Szirmai 1991; Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 1995; 
Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Austen 2002; Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; 
Svallfors 2004; Knudsen 2001; Larsen 2006;  Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Kerr 2011). 
Reviewing this literature it becomes apparent that all scientific contributions so far have focused on 
just one dimension of attitudes towards pay. This is attitudes towards difference in levels of pay or 
pay-inequality if you like. Despite only a dozen studies exist actually using the measure; the dimen-
sion is measured in different ways. Typically an index is constructed on the basis of a ratio between 
a number of higher level occupations to lower level occupations (Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 
1995; Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Austen 2002; Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; 
Svallfors 2004 and Kerr 2011). A different approach compares the ratio of a single occupation to 
either one other or to groups of other occupations (Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004 
and Larsen 2006). Knudsen (2001) is the only one making a measure, where he is focussing just on 
the highly-paid occupations. His argument for this is that, while there is a big degree of consensus, 
concerning what pay is just for the low-paid occupations, the variation is much larger at the top. 
In contrast to the other research contributions using the measure Osberg & Smeeding (2006) and 
Szirmai (1991) also try to include the measures for the perception of, what the same occupations are 
actually paid on average, in a combined measure. These measures then denote, how much the ideal 
of the respondents for a fair degree of pay-inequality deviates from their perception of, what the 
actual degree of pay-inequality is (Osberg & Smeeding 2006, 460 and Szirmai 1991, 231).  
While Osberg & Smeeding (2006) and Szirmai (1991) have a somewhat different approach than the 
other research contributions; the focus is firstly still on a form of measure of attitudes towards dif-
ference in levels of pay. Secondly these two articles follow a general trend in the contributions in 
trying to create just one measure on the basis of the survey-question posed for a number of occupa-
tions. A possible explanation, of why this is often the case, is that the contributions in general seem 
to be regression-analysis focused. There is of course nothing wrong with writing scientific articles 
applying regression-analysis, but to conserve space and meet the page-wise limitations of any scien-
tific journal, the authors have probably been forced to limit the preliminary descriptive analyses. 
                                                 
7 See Larsen (2006, 34-37) for a short review of this literature. 
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The purpose with the preliminary descriptive analyses thus seem to be to create and present one 
measure that can be used as a dependent variable in the focal point of the article; a regressional 
model seeking to explain variance within and between countries (see especially Szirmai 1991; 
Svallfors 1995; Svallfors 1997; Svallfors 2004; Austen 1999 and Austen 2002). 
In this paper the focus is not on creating one dependent variable, but on making in depth descriptive 
investigations of different dimensions of attitudes towards pay. Therefore the analyses below will 
not be restricted to one dimension or not even necessarily one measure per dimension, as the trend 
certainly have been in the existing contributions.  
More practical methodological considerations are also important. Larsen (2006) wisely emphasises 
two important aspects of how to treat the data. Firstly one is wise to use the median instead of the 
regularly used average as a measure of central tendency. The measures, one can create on the basis 
of the mentioned survey question, all seem to be infected by the presence of extreme outliers influ-
encing the average a lot. The median is not to the same extent affected by these outliers, why it is a 
more obvious choice for a measure of central tendency. Secondly as with all aggregated measures, 
the measures of the existing research conceal important information in the data. A high degree of 
tolerance towards pay-inequality can thus be caused by both; tolerance towards top-excess, accept 
of very low salaries for the lower skilled parts of the workforce or both. By disaggregating and us-
ing “skilled factory worker” as a middle category Larsen (2006) finds interesting differences be-
tween the countries that are not possible to detect with the aggregated measures (pp. 37-43)8.  
Reviewing the existing research on the field it becomes apparent that there is room for improvement 
- a quest which this article seeks to undertake. Firstly a very concrete and practical methodological 
improvement is using medians instead of averages, as the measure of central tendency. Secondly as 
quoted above Svallfors (2004, 82) correctly pinpoints the great versatility of the measure. The exist-
ing research is not taking full advantage of this. As a starting point the measures will be disaggre-
gated much more, than what’s usual in the existing research. Thirdly and most importantly the ver-
satility allows for using the measure to investigate a number of other aspects or dimensions relevant 
for investigating attitudes towards pay, than just the attitudes towards pay-inequality, as the existing 
studies do.  
                                                 
8 As mentioned Knudsen (2001) and Osberg & Smeeding (2006) find that the respondents disagree much more about 
the salaries of the better paid occupations than the lower paid ones. These results suggest are an effect of disaggregating 
and indicates the value of doing so. 
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Below four such dimensions of attitudes towards pay will be identified and operationalised. These 
are: 
 Levels of pay 
 Difference in levels of pay 
 Degree of justice in levels of pay 
 Consensus 
Before diving into these dimensions, the methodological aspects of the measure: “What do you 
think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get…?”, will be dis-
cussed. This section includes a discussion of whether another more commonly used measure: ”Dif-
ferences in income in <country> are too large”, is better in tapping the dimension of difference in 
levels of pay. 
 
3.2 Methodological considerations - A relative or more absolute meas-
ure of difference in levels of pay?   
As Osberg & Smeeding (2006) argues the most straightforward way to investigate people’s atti-
tudes towards income or pay-inequality is asking them directly. Often the right questions are not 
present in the surveys, one wants to use, and researchers then use proxies or try indirectly to meas-
ure a concept, but this is actually not the case here. In the same Social Inequality modules of ISSP 
as well as numerous other surveys the question: ”Differences in income in <country> are too 
large”9 is asked. 
In spite the presence of this question in numerous surveys and the fact that it seems the most direct 
measure of the concept of attitudes towards income-inequality, good arguments exist of why not to 
use it in the analyses of this article. The main critique of the ordinal scaled question is that has a 
relative bias. It is clearly less obvious to give a confirmatory answer to the question in the Scandi-
navian countries, where the actual level of income-inequality is very low by comparative standards 
(Esping Andersen 1990; Esping Andersen 1999; Larsen 2008; Ervasti et al 2008 and Fridberg & 
Kangas 2008), than in countries, where this is not the case (Larsen 2006 and Osberg & Smeeding 
2006). The Scandinavian attitudes measured by this question are thus often found to be very anti-
                                                 
9 It is an ordinal scaled variable with the categories “Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree and 
Strongly disagree”. The question is also posed in the “Role of Government” modules of ISSP as well as a number of 
Eurobarometer surveys (Larsen 2006, 35).  
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egalitarian compared to other western countries (Evans 1996; Lübker 2004; Larsen 2006 and Os-
berg & Smeeding 2006). 
The measure presented above: “What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless 
of what they actually get…?”, can be argued not in the same degree to have this relative bias. It can 
thus be transformed into a more absolute measure of attitudes towards pay-inequality. Many of the 
factors influencing the relative measure can thus be argued to a higher extent to be kept constant 
(Osberg & Smeeding 2006 and Larsen 2006). 
Firstly the effect of the actual income-distribution in a country hampering the relative measure is 
kept quite constant. A respondents opinion on, what an unskilled factory worker ought to earn, is 
not at the outset connected to the actual level of income-inequality in the respondents country. Ar-
guments do exist that contextual factor is of importance for the more absolute measure also 
though10. 
A second but related advantage is that the welfare state is more out of the picture in the more abso-
lute measure. The reason is that the question concerns attitudes towards pay and not attitudes to-
wards the distribution of income. The relative measure on the contrary could be interpreted as a 
proxy for an ideological position on the economical right-left scale of politics (Larsen 2006). A con-
firmatory answer to the question can thus also be interpreted as a proxy for a political or ideological 
statement, also correlating with positive attitudes towards the welfare state, taxes and redistribution 
in general11. 
A third and more survey-methodological advantage of the more absolute measure is that it is a very 
concrete and not abstract question. It is an often heard critique of the survey-method in social sci-
ences that the respondents’ answers reflect the norms of society, and not their actual opinions. Act-
ing on a logic of appropriateness the respondents seek to please the interviewer by giving answers 
matching the norms and values of the society. Experimental results suggest that this bias is especial-
ly prominent in very general and abstract questions (Lolle & Goul Andersen forthcoming). The rel-
ative, but not the more absolute, measure is exactly such an abstract and general question, why the 
researcher cannot rule out that the respondents’ answers on this question to a high extent reflects the 
                                                 
10 Cf. The adaption-hypothesis (Kelley & Evans 1993; Miller 1995; Blanchflower & Freeman 1997; Austen 1999; Aus-
ten 2002; Knudsen 2001 and Kerr 2011). 
11In a factor analysis and reliability test all the six items of the batteries of Q6 and Q7a-b correlate strongly. They form a 
clear and reliable factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0,637. These items all tap classical political questions of the role of 
government towards unemployed and poor as well as questions about the tax level. This indicates that when answering 
the more relative question, the underlying bases for the respondents to a high extent are their ideological position on the 
economical right-left scale. 
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norms of the societies, rather than the true opinions of the respondents. In the more absolute meas-
ure on the other hand, the respondent is “tricked” to give his/her opinion on a quite general and ab-
stract concept, answering a very concrete question. As Szirmai (1991) points out the risk of “social-
ly desirable responses” is clearly minimised using the more absolute measure. 
Finally the absolute measure is very versatile. It can be manipulated and adapted in a lot of ways – 
all giving insight in different aspects of attitudes towards pay (Svallfors 2004, 82). The analyses 
below will make good use of this advantage and adapt the measure to be able to tab all four dimen-
sions: levels of pay, difference in levels of pay and degree of justice in levels of pay, consensus. On-
ly in the operationalisation of the dimension – degree of justice in levels of pay – another survey 
item will also be used. This resembles the more absolute measure, only should earn is switched 
with actually earn.  
4. Operationalisation and analyses of the four 
dimensions of attitudes towards pay 
In the sections below the four dimensions will be operationalised and analysed in turn. The focus is 
in all sections the Scandinavian countries. For each of the dimensions data and tables from both 
ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2009 will be presented. In this way it is possible to investigate the develop-
ment over a 10 year time span. The comparative approach is thus not just cross-country, but also 
longitudinal. Because the number of occupations is reduced from 9 to 5 from ISSP 1999 to ISSP 
2009, it has not been possible to replicate all analyses. The lacking occupation “skilled factory 
worker” makes it impossible to follow the approach of Larsen (2006), and disaggregate the general 
measures of attitudes towards pay-inequality on ISSP 2009-data.  
 
4.1 Attitudes towards level of pay – the ordinary Scandinavians 
The first dimension – attitudes towards level of pay – simply treats the question of, how much the 
respondents in the different countries generally think the various occupations should earn. As such 
it should be the first very simple descriptive measure presented, giving a quick overview of the data. 
Straightforwardly the medians for the different occupations in the different countries should be suf-
ficient to measure this dimension. Unfortunately it is not that simple – and one could suspect the 
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difficulties in acquiring comparable measures are one of the reasons, others have not ventured into 
this task. The first difficulty is noted by Kelley & Evans (1993): 
”Cross-cultural comparisons are difficult because the original answers are in local currencies – dollars, pounds, for-
ints, and so forth” (s.85).  
To overcome this and set a common standard all indications of pay have been recalculated to “pur-
chasing power parity” (PPP) corrected dollars $12. Hereby it should be possible to compare directly, 
how much a person can actually buy for the pay indicated:  
”The PPP currency values reflect the number of units of a country's currency required to buy the same quantity of 
comparable goods and services in the local market as one U.S. dollar would buy in an average country.” (World Re-
sources Institute 1996, box 7.2). 
There is also a difficulty with the 1999-data for the countries, who were then members of the Euro-
zone. In a non-physical form the Euro was introduced on 1. January 1999, but the physical currency 
of the countries was still local until 1. January 2002. This means that while the respondents in these 
countries are asked to give their statements in French francs, German marks and Austrian schilling 
etc., the PPP-conversion rates for the same countries in 1999 assume, their currency is Euro. There-
fore I have had to firstly recalculate the local currency statements to Euros for the then members of 
the Eurozone (also Slovenia)13, and then to PPP corrected $. 
The second difficulty, which Kelley & Evans (1993) did not face, is that it has been up to the indi-
vidual countries to decide certain specifics of the question in 1999 and 2009 (but not in 1987 and 
1992). The instruction in 1999 and 2009 was merely that it had to match the traditions in the coun-
try14. The result has been a great deal of variation, in how the question has been posed in the various 
countries. Firstly it varies, whether the respondents are asked to give their opinion on monthly sala-
ries or yearly salaries. The monthly indications have easily been recalculated to yearly salaries by 
multiplying with 12.  
The second variation is causing bigger problems though. It thus also varies, whether the respondents 
are asked about gross or net salaries. I have chosen to recalculate all the respondents’ statements 
into net salaries. Income tax regimes are by default difficult to compare. I have thus been forced to 
                                                 
12 Furthermore I have also recalculated to Euro’s. See Appendix 7.1 and 7.2. 
13 The original members of the Eurozone where: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Monaco, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, the Vatican state and Austria. Therefore recalculations from local 
currencies to Euros have been made for: France, Portugal, Spain, West-Germany, East-Germany and Austria. Further-
more the same recalculations have been made for Slovenia in 1999. Even if this country was not one of the original 
Eurozone-members (they became so in 2004) their PPP-conversion rates clearly assumes that Slovenia had Euros in 
1999. The same is not the case for Cyprus, even if they became Eurozone-members in 2008. 
14 Se the source questionnaires available at www.gesis.org/issp  
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choose a specific conversion factor. Using the OECD statistics for ”Taxing Wages” I have chosen 
the conversion factor ”average rate of income tax and employees’ social security contributions (%)” 
for ”single person at 100 % of average earnings, no child” (www.stats.oecd.org)15. Surely this 
choice of tax conversion factor has some limitations. In recalculating there are probably some devi-
ations from the actual income tax, a given occupation ought to earn in a certain country. On the oth-
er hand it is difficult to find a better general conversion rate. A further advantage is that OECD does 
not have tax regime data for all the western countries present in the two datasets. By choosing net 
salaries and not gross salaries the numbers of countries in the following tables are maximised.  
After all these corrections and recalculations it is possible to present simple descriptive tables de-
scribing, what the median-respondent in the various western countries think, the various occupa-
tions should earn net per year in PPP corrected $ in 1999 and 2009. In the table for 2009 all the five 
available occupations are presented. In the table for 1999 the same five occupations as well as 
“skilled factory worker” presented16. The result is presented below17: 
                                                 
15I have recalculated from gross to net salaries using the following formu-
la: )1(* ratetaxincomesalaryGrosssalaryNet  . In the opposite recalculation from net to gross salaries used in ap-
pendix 7.1 and 7.2, I have used the following formula: 
ratetaxincome
salaryNet
salaryGross


1
. In both instances the income 
tax rate is measured in proportions. 
16Obviously the different price levels in the countries affect the PPP conversion rates a lot. Furthermore especially for 
the countries with high income taxes (including social contributions), there is a big difference between net and gross 
salaries. For the sake of comparison I have therefore calculated two alternative tables for each dataset. Here I am firstly 
recalculating to gross salaries and secondly to Euros instead of PPP corrected $ (see appendix 1 and 2). 
17 To conserve space in the tables below, which are already very big, abbreviations for the countries have been used. In 
appendix 7.6 a list of these country abbreviations can be found. 
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TABLE 1. Attitudes to yearly net payA for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country median 
in PPP corrected $B. 
a cabinet minis-
ter in the <na-
tional> govern-
ment 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in 
a factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a factory  
 
Country -
averages 
FR 57.949 FR 96.582 USA 75.090 USA 26.657 NO 19.574 CDN 18.825 USA 45.117 
AUS 57.747 CDN 90.988 CDN 62.750 CDN 26.355 CDN 18.825 USA 18.773 CDN 44.134 
USA 56.318 GB 85.472 AUS 57.747 NO 23.302 USA 18.773 NO 18.642 FR 42.174 
GB 53.563 USA 75.090 FR 48.291 AUS 23.099 AUS 17.324 FR 15.453 GB 38.748 
AT 52.815 AUS 57.747 NO 46.604 GB 20.513 ES 15.633 ES 15.124 AUS 38.016 
CDN 47.063 WD 53.011 GB 45.585 ES 19.802 FR 15.453 AUS 14.437 NO 32.002 
IL 45.466 AT 52.815 NZ 42.215 FR 19.316 DK 14.480 DK 13.822 AT 31.359 
PT 44.470 NZ 52.768 AT 39.611 NZ 18.469 GB 13.676 GB 13.676 NZ 30.342 
WD 42.409 SLO 49.347 WD 35.341 AT 16.505 IL 13.640 AT 13.204 IL 27.027 
NZ 42.215 NO 46.604 DK 32.909 DK 16.454 AT 13.204 NZ 13.192 PT 24.755 
ES 41.688 IL 45.466 IL 30.311 WD 15.903 NZ 13.192 SE 12.318 WD 28.273 
NO 37.283 ES 41.688 ED 28.273 IL 15.155 WD 12.369 IL 12.124 ES 26.839 
SLO 37.010 PT 44.470 ES 27.097 SE 14.987 SE 12.318 WD 10.602 DK 23.694 
ED 35.341 ED 35.341 PT 26.682 ED 14.136 SLO 11.103 PT 8.894 SLO 23.645 
CY 34.783 PL 33.538 SLO 24.673 PT 13.341 PT 10.673 ED 8.835 ED 22.088 
PL 33.538 LV 32.941 SE 24.636 SLO 11.103 ED 10.602 SLO 8.636 SE 20.291 
DK 32.909 CZ 32.456 CY 22.609 PL 10.061 CY 7.826 CY 8.087 PL 17.887 
CZ 29.210 DK 31.593 PL 16.769 CY 10.435 LV 7.059 PL 6.708 CY 17.725 
SE 28.742 SE 28.742 CZ 12.982 LV 9.412 PL 6.708 CZ 5.193 CZ 15.795 
RUS 24.793 RUS 24.793 BG 11.673 CZ 8.439 CZ 6.491 LV 4.706 LV 14.510 
LV 23.529 HU 22.960 HU 11.480 RUS 7.438 HU 5.357 BG 4.669 HU 12.245 
HU 22.960 CY 22.609 LV 9.412 BG 7.004 BG 4.669 HU 4.592 BG 9.728 
BG 16.342 BG 14.008 RUS 7.438 HU 6.123 RUS 3.719 RUS 2.479 RUS 8.110 
AThe following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The 
remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is un-
specified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remain-
ing countries have asked about gross salaries.   
BThe PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates 
are defined as: “National currency per current international dollar”, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements 
with the current PPP-conversion rate.http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
For the following countries preliminary recalculations from local currency to Euro have been made – followed by another recalculation to PPP-
corrected $: France, Portugal, Spain, West- and East Germany, Austria and Slovenia. The reason is, that the PPP-conversion rates for these countries 
prescribes that the local currency is Euro also in 1999. 
The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguesestatements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked to 
answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-
profiles/social-inequality/1999/ ). 
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Table 1 show that the Scandinavian respondents in a comparative perspective are not characterised, 
by wanting exceptionally high salaries. The tendency is rather that the Scandinavians’ scores are 
quite average in a comparative sense. In both of the alternative tables (see appendix 7.1 and 7.2), 
the Scandinavian countries score higher for all occupations. Firstly the high income taxes pull the 
Scandinavian, but also Continental-European countries down, when one calculates net- instead of 
gross salaries. Not surprisingly the tax rate matters much more in these countries than in other west-
ern countries. Secondly one could speculate that high staple goods prices in the Scandinavian coun-
tries pull down the score of the PPP corrected $ of table 1. The Scandinavian positions are surely 
higher in the alternative table displaying non-corrected Euros. 
Turning to the general pattern in the countries the respondents seem to agree on a hierarchy of the 
occupations. The highly paid occupations of the first three columns score above the country averag-
es in all instances, while the lower paid occupations in the three last columns score below. Also the 
poorer countries/the ones with lowest wage levels – especially the Central- and Eastern European 
countries - have a tendency to be placed in the lower half of the columns, while the opposite counts 
for the richer countries. Even if correcting with PPP rates, the actual context in a country thus seem 
to matter a lot for the score. This is probably because the individuals’ assessment of should earn in 
general takes the departure in an assessment of do actually earn (Miller 1995).  
Probing deeper into the position of the different occupations of the Scandinavian countries in a 
comparative sense, a rising tendency from left to right can be seen in the table. Denmark and Swe-
den are in the lower half of the table concerning the salaries of ministers and chairmen. For the 
three lowest paid occupations Denmark and Sweden are instead in the upper half of the table. Nor-
way in each instance score higher than Denmark and Sweden.  
Other groups of countries do not follow the same rising pattern from left to right as the Scandinavi-
an countries. The Continental European countries portray the exact opposite pattern of a declining 
tendency from left to right in the table. The Anglo-Saxon countries with the exception of New Zea-
land are consistently in the top of the table, while the Post-Communist countries consistently are at 
the bottom.  
Nor the Scandinavian positions or averages are thus very unique in a comparative perspective. The 
pattern of the positions in the table on the other hand does not seem to be replicated by other groups 
of countries. In table 2 below it will be investigated, if a similar tendency applies in 2009. The table 
is a replication of table 1 with newer data, except the missing fourth columns of a skilled factory 
worker. 
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TABLE 2. Attitudes to yearly net payA for five occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medi-
ans in PPP corrected $B. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment  
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker 
in a factory  
 
Country -averages 
CH 140.515 AUS 160.381 USA 115.845 CH 31.616 CH 28.103 CH 85.012 
AUS 80.191 USA 154.460 AUS 96.229 USA 23.169 USA 23.169 USA 79.959 
FR 79.034 CH 140.515 CH 84.309 NO 22.590 NO 22.590 AUS 75.914 
USA 77.230 FR 131.723 GB 76.264 IS 22.324 IS 22.324 FR 63.491 
NZ 75.082 GB 113.826 NZ 66.174 DK 21.446 AUS 21.384 GB 58.962 
GB 68.296 FI 88.873 FR 65.862 AUS 21.384 SE 21.227 NZ 51.666 
DE 66.118 DE 82.648 NO 52.709 FR 21.076 ES 20.103 DE 45.622 
IL 64.918 NZ 81.444 IS 52.089 FL 20.339 FL 20.339 FI 44.436 
PL 61.475 AT 75.999 DK 50.040 SE 20.262 DK 20.016 IS 43.159 
IS 59.530 SL 75.117 DE 49.589 IL 19.475 FR 19.759 AT 42.707 
AT 56.999 PT 68.966 AT 47.499 ES 18.557 IL 19.475 IL 42.196 
SL 56.338 FL 65.763 FL 47.458 GB 18.212 GB 18.212 SL 42.065 
FL 54.237 ES 61.856 SL 46.948 NZ 17.816 NZ 17.816 FL 41.627 
DK 53.614 PL 61.475 FI 44.436 FI 17.774 FI 17.775 NO 41.414 
FI 53.324 IL 64.918 SE 43.419 AT 17.100 AT 15.437 PT 38.103 
NO 52.709 IS 59.530 PT 43.103 SL 16.901 SL 15.023 ES 37.114 
EE 52.493 EE 59.055 IL 42.196 DE 16.530 DE 13.224 SE 36.279 
PT 51.724 NO 56.474 ES 38.660 PT 13.793 EE 13.123 DK 36.172 
SE 48.243 SE 48.243 PL 30.738 EE 13.123 PL 12.295 PL 35.656 
ES 46.392 RUS 45.859 HR 28.255 PL 12.295 PT 12.931 EE 32.808 
RUS 45.859 HR 42.383 EE 26.247 HR 11.302 HR 11.302 RUS 24.895 
SK 43.361 HU 42.119 CZ 26.023 SK 10.844 SK 10.844 SK 24.576 
HU 42.119 CZ 39.034 TR 25.862 LV 10.370 LV 10.370 HR 24.299 
TR 41.379 SK 36.146 SK 21.687 TR 10.345 TR 10.345 TR 23.793 
CZ 32.528 DK 35.743 HU 18.427 RUS 9.827 RUS 9.827 HU 23.692 
LV 29.630 TR 31.034 LV 17.778 CZ 9.758 CZ 9.758 CZ 23.420 
HR 28.255 UA 30.447 RUS 13.103 HU 7.897 HU 7.897 LV 19.556 
UA 26.641 LV 29.630 UA 11.418 UA 7.612 UA 7.612 UA 16.746 
AThe following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining coun-
tries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in 
these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.   
BThe PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates 
are defined as: “National currency per current international dollar”, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements 
with the current PPP-conversion rate. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
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Table 2 generally repeats the patterns of table 1 (the same goes in the alternative tables of appendix 
7.1 and 7.2). The Scandinavian countries’ averages are still in the middle of the table, and a rising 
tendencies from left to right in the table are displayed. Going more into detail the Scandinavian 
countries’ medians are somewhat closer in 2009 than in 1999. Furthermore the countries are placed 
a little bit higher for the lowest paid occupations, but still below USA and Switzerland. As the case 
was in 1999, the Scandinavian countries are placed higher, when re-calculating to gross salaries or 
Euros (see appendix 7.2). 
Also the other groupings of countries more or less repeat the pattern of 1999. The Post-Communist 
countries are in general still placed in the bottom of table 2. Countries as Slovenia and Poland now 
have medians resembling the Mediterranean countries though. The Anglo-Saxon countries are still 
in the top of the table, while the Continental European countries still display a declining tendency 
from left to right in the table. 
Several new western countries are present in ISSP 2009. These also include the Nordic countries 
Iceland and Finland. Iceland more or less follows the pattern of the other Scandinavian countries, 
though with a somewhat higher median for ministers. The same is not the case for Finland. Fin-
land’s pattern resembles the Continental European countries of Germany and Austria, rather than 
the Scandinavian countries. The only exception is the minister median. The Finnish median is here 
at the Scandinavian level. 
In sum the Scandinavian attitudes towards level of pay at first glance does not seem exceptional at 
all. The Scandinavian averages in 1999 and 2009 are placed in the middle of the tables. Furthermore 
the Scandinavian medians for the individual occupations are in no case exceptional that is in the 
bottom or top of the tables. If one instead looks at the patterns across the occupations of different 
groups of countries in the two tables, the Scandinavian countries do seem exceptional, by displaying 
a rising pattern from left to right in both tables. This is firstly opposing the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Post-Communist countries, which are consistently placed at the top and the bottom of the tables 
respectively. Secondly it is opposing the Continental European countries (plus Finland), who dis-
play a declining tendency from left to right in both tables. The Scandinavians thus do not seem es-
pecially egalitarian in wishing very high levels of pay for the lower paid occupations compared to 
other rich western countries. Instead the higher paid occupations are consistently placed low. In 
everyday language, this preliminary result suggests a Scandinavian egalitarianism characterized by 
an aversion towards top excess, rather than a spoiled bottom. In the section below this subject will 
more thoroughly be investigated by looking into the attitudes towards difference in levels of pay. 
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4.2 Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay – the exceptionally 
egalitarian Scandinavians 
The second dimension – attitudes towards difference in levels of pay – treats the subject of, how 
much the respondents think some professions should earn more than others. As described above, the 
existing studies have solely focused on this dimension and different measures of this concept. The 
existing studies often use just one measure of this concept; contrasting this approach and making 
use of the described versatility (Svallfors 2004), competing measures will be constructed in table 3 
and 4 below. Firstly in both tables three different measures of attitudes towards the general differ-
ence in levels of pay will be constructed. The first of these includes all five occupations present in 
both ISSP 1999 and 2009. It is a highly aggregated measure, indicating how much more the re-
spondents think ministers, chairmen or general practitioners should earn than shop assistants or un-
skilled factory workers.  
Even if highly aggregated measures is often used in existing studies, it could be argued not to be the 
most valid measure of the concept, possible to construct. As mentioned above, clear indications 
exist of a bigger variation concerning the highly paid occupations, than the lower paid ones (Knud-
sen 2001 and Osberg & Smeeding 2006). This could be caused by the inclusion of “general practi-
tioners” in the top group. Larsen (2006) argues that in several countries the salaries of doctor’s are 
not top level, but closer to medium level (pp. 40). A second and less aggregated measure will thus 
be created by excluding the doctors from the top group.  
A third and even less aggregated measure will be created by also excluding “cabinet ministers in the 
national government” from the top group. The argument is that a respondent’s view, on how much a 
minister ought to earn, could possibly be influenced by his/her level of sympathy with the current 
government (Kelley & Evans 1993, 85). Furthermore the same could also be the case with the gen-
eral level of political and institutional trust in the country. In countries where these are low, like for 
example the post-communist countries, the Mediterranean countries and the USA, the respondents 
are probably not willing to pay high salaries to ministers. This index also reflects a classical worker-
capital dichotomy.  
Secondly as the case is with all aggregated measures, information is lost by aggregating (Larsen 
2006). Following the approach of Larsen (2006), the general 1999-measures will be disaggregated. 
To tap the top-middle ratio two competing measures are created. The first indicates, how much 
more the respondents think ministers, chairmen or general practitioners should earn than a skilled 
factory worker. The second follows the arguments above and merely calculate a chairman- vs. 
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skilled factory worker ratio. Top tap the middle-bottom ratio just one measure will be constructed. 
This indicates how much more the respondents think a skilled factory worker should earn than a 
shop assistant or an unskilled factory worker. Because the occupation “skilled factory worker” is 
excluded from the occupational question battery in ISSP 2009, these disaggregated measures can 
only be constructed with 1999-data. The results are displayed in table 3 and 4 below: 
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TABLE 3. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are 
country medians in levels of differences. 
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
DHigh paid occ. 
Vs. Skilled worker 
EChairmen vs. 
Skilled worker 
FSkilled worker vs. 
Low paid occ. 
RUS 4.67 RUS 6.00 FR 6.25 FR 4.17 FR 5.00 RUS 1.85
FR 4.52 PL 5.19 RUS 5.71 RUS 4.08 SLO 3.75 LV 1.60
GB 4.36 CZ 5.00 GB 5.56 PL 3.83 HU 3.75 BG 1.50
PL 4.33 LV 5.00 LV 5.36 HU 3.75 GB 3.71 USA 1.45
AUS 4.18 FR 5.00 CZ 5.00 CZ 3.67 CZ 3.50 GB 1.43
CZ 4.17 GB 4.90 PL 4.67 SLO 3.50 LV 3.33 CDN 1.40
USA 4.09 HU 4.57 HU 4.61 PT 3.42 PT 3.33 CZ 1.36
PT 4.00 PT 4.50 CDN 4.47 GB 3.33 PL 3.33 CY 1.33
LV 3.93 WD 4.29 USA 4.44 WD 3.25 WD 3.33 AUS 1.33
NZ 3.89 ED 4.15 NZ 4.44 AT 3.17 NZ 3.33 ED 1.33
HU 3.89 SLO 4.08 SLO 4.44 NZ 3.00 AUS 3.33 PL 1.33
WD 3.84 USA 4.00 WD 4.44 ED 3.00 USA 3.25 NZ 1.33
CDN 3.77 NZ 4.00 PT 4.35 IL 3.00 AT 3.20 PT 1.30
ED 3.73 AT 3.89 ED 4.08 LV 3.00 CDN 3.20 WD 1.29
AT 3.64 AUS 3.75 AT 4.00 AUS 2.92 ED 3.00 AT 1.25
SLO 3.64 CDN 3.63 AUS 4.00 USA 2.86 RUS 3.00 ES 1.24
CY 3.30 CY 3.50 IL 3.64 CY 2.67 IL 3.00 FR 1.21
IL 3.30 IL 3.44 BG 2.86 CDN 2.50 CY 2.39 HU 1.20
BG 2.79 BG 3.11 CY 2.83 ES 2.08 ES 2.00 IL 1.20
DK 2.33 ES 2.57 ES 2.50 BG 2.00 BG 1.80 NO 1.20
ES 2.31 DK 2.25 NO 2.13 DK 2.00 SE 1.78 SE 1.17
SE 2.10 SE 2.21 SE 2.08 SE 1.88 NO 1.75 DK 1.15
NO 2.02 NO 2.00 DK 2.00 NO 1.67 DK 1.67 SLO 1.14
Average 3.60  3.96  4.08 2.99 3.03  1.33
Scand. 2.15  2.15  2.07 1.85 1.73  1.17
Others 3.82  4.23  4.38 3.16 3.05  1.35
AThe wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in 
the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop 
assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second. 
BThis index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.  
D The index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average statements of the top occupations, with the statement of a skilled 
factory worker. 
EThis index taps the chairmen skilled worker wage ratio. 
FThis index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low paid occupations – shop assistant and unskilled worker in a factory.  
 
 
Table 3 clearly shows that the Scandinavian countries are exceptionally egalitarian in 1999. This is 
true, no matter which of the three general measures are used (column 1-3), or when disaggregating 
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in top-middle/middle-bottom ratios (column 4-6). As the calculated averages show, Scandinavians 
only want the top occupations to earn around two times more than the bottom occupations, while 
average in the remaining countries is approximately four times. It is also worth noticing in the dis-
aggregated measures of column 4-6 that the Scandinavian medians most clearly stands out from the 
remaining countries, when looking at the top-medium relationship of column 4-5. As suggested 
above, this again suggests that the Scandinavian egalitarianism is characterised by an aversion to 
top excess, rather than a spoiled bottom. 
The extraordinary Scandinavian results are not the only result of interest in table 3. Firstly it is clear 
that subtracting the occupations general practitioner and minister in column 2 and 3 respectively 
actually makes a big difference on the country rankings. Withdrawing the general practitioner occu-
pation, the scores of many Post-Communist countries are increased notably. When subtracting the 
minister occupation, a similar but somewhat smaller effect can be seen with the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. The explanation for these results can be found in table 1. The median should earn-salary of 
doctors in most Post-Communist countries are thus markedly lower, than the corresponding minis-
ter and chairman salaries. This is in line with Larsen’s (2006) arguments, but not the case in general 
in other countries. In the Anglo-Saxon countries it is the ministers, who are not supposed to earn as 
much as the chairmen and doctors.  
Secondly these results also indicate that many of the Post-Communist countries apparently have 
accepted the greater wage dispersion rates followed by the transitions to market economy. This atti-
tudinal transition is also noticed in some of the exiting studies using earlier data of 1987 and 1992 
(Kelley & Evans 1993; Austen 1999; Austen 2002 and Blanchflower & Freeman 1997)18. 
Thirdly the results of Larsen (2006) seem to be blurred, when including the Post-Communist coun-
tries (column 4-5): Of the Continental European countries only France seems to be a real top-
outlier, together with some post-communist countries not included in Larsen’s analysis. There is not 
much difference between the remaining Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries though. 
In column 6 the Anglo-Saxon countries are as Larsen stated placed higher than the continental Eu-
ropean countries, but this result is again “overruled” by the score of many Post-Communist coun-
tries (pp. 39-41). Table 4 below will replicate the analysis above albeit with 2009-data. The absent 
occupation “skilled factory worker” prevents the replication of column 4-6 of table 3: 
                                                 
18 Results of the next section oppositely indicate that the attitudinal transition is not finished yet. Even if the median 
values of differences in pay have increased in many Post-Communist countries, the respondents want to increase the 
actual pay of the low paid occupations and oppositely reduce the pay of the high paid occupations considerably. 
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TABLE 4. Attitudes towards difference in levels of pay for the five occupations in ISSP 2009. 
Shown are country medians in levels of differences.  
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CY 6.47 CY 6.28 AUS 8.00
AUS 5.81 AUS 6.15 FR 6.67
CZ 5.74 AT 5.37 USA 6.49
USA 5.51 FR 5.36 NZ 6.01
FR 4.77 DE 5.05 DE 5.45
GB 4.61 USA 5.00 GB 5.26
DE 4.56 PL 5.00 H 5.00
PT 4.36 H 5.00 PL 5.00
NZ 4.33 RUS 5.00 PT 5.00
CH 4.17 CH 4.78 RUS 5.00
H 4.17 GB 4.67 AT 4.83
PL 4.13 PT 4.62 EE 4.67
67AT 4.05 EE 4.50 CY 4.57
RUS 4.00 NZ 4.33 CH 4.44
E 3.92 SLO 4.08 SLO 4.44
EE 3.91 CZ 3.87 FIN 4.17
TR 3.33 PT 3.85 CZ 4.00
FIN 3.33 FIN 3.75 IL 3.64
SLK 3.30 TR 3.60 SLK 3.53
HR 3.00 UA 3.33 HR 3.51
SLO 2.89 HR 3.30 UA 3.33
BG 2.87 IL 3.25 TR 3.20
IL 2.86 BG 3.00 BG 3.08
UA 2.79 LV 3.00 LV 3.00
FL 2.67 FL 2.83 E 2.86
LV 2.67 E 2.83 FL 2.84
IS 2.53 IS 2.60 IS 2.67
DK 2.53 DK 2.50 NO 2.33
NO 2.32 SE 2.38 SE 2.22
SE 2.30 NO 2.27 DK 2.00
Average 3.80  4.05  4.24
Skand. 2.38  2.38  2.18
Others 3.95  4.24  4.47
A The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in 
the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop 
assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second. 
29 
 
B This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.  
 
Table 4 shows that the Scandinavian countries are still clearly the most egalitarian in 2009, no mat-
ter which of the three measures are used. The Scandinavian egalitarianism in attitudes towards dif-
ferences in levels of pay is thus clear and consistent in a comparative perspective. However the 
Scandinavians have become slightly less egalitarian. The Scandinavian averages of approximately 
2.38 are thus a little bit higher than 2.15 of 1999. This anti-egalitarian move still dwarfs, when 
comparing with the development, countries like Cyprus, Australia as well as several of the Post-
Communist countries. As the case was in table 2, the Icelandic medians are actually on a Scandina-
vian level, while the Finnish are much higher. 
The most notable development when comparing table 4 with table 3 is furthermore that the Anglo-
Saxon countries have climbed up the table surpassing most Post-Communist countries. The Anglo-
Saxon countries are followed closely by Continental European countries like Germany and France, 
while Flanders oppositely has values closely resembling the Scandinavian.   
 
4.3 Attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay – the unjust sala-
ries of chairmen in Scandinavia 
The analysis of the third dimension – attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay – also in-
corporates data of the question, of how much the respondents think the people in different occupa-
tions actually earn usually. The disaggregated measures created below are inspired by Osberg & 
Smeeding’s (2006) aggregated measure of: 
“…how much the respondents own personal estimate of the actual degree of inequality in pay among a range of occu-
pations diverges from his or her own estimate of “fair” inequality within this range of occupations.” (pp. 460). 
But instead of pooling all occupations in one overall measure as done by Osberg & Smeeding 
(2006), the measures below will look at each occupation separately.  
The first step in creating these measures is, for each respondent, subtracting how much he/she 
thinks a certain occupation should earn, with the same respondents perception of, what the same 
occupation actually earns usually. A positive figure on this measure indicates that the respondent 
thinks, the occupation should earn more, than it is perceived to do usually. As the case was concern-
ing the analyses of the first dimension, the problem with this preliminary measure is that it is in 
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local currency. It also varies whether the respondents refer to a net or a gross sum, and if they refer 
to monthly or yearly salaries.  
To be able to compare the country median values in this case also, a second step is thus to standard-
ise the preliminary first measure. This is done simply by dividing the preliminary measure, with the 
“actually earns usually” statement of the respondent for the same occupation. In this way a stand-
ardised measure is created. This denotes how big a proportion of the perceived salary of a certain 
occupation, the respondent would want the salary to increase or decrease. The results of 1999 and 
2009 are displayed below in table 5 and 6: 
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TABLE 5. Degree of justice in levels of pay for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country 
medians of these measuresA. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in a 
factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker 
in a factory  
 
BG 0.00 BG 0.00 RUS 2.75 RUS 1.50 RUS 1.00 RUS 1.50 
NO -0.02 LV 0.00 LV 1.25 LV 0.88 LV 1.00 LV 1.00 
DK -0.08 ES -0.13 BG 1.00 BG 0.67 BG 0.67 BG 0.71 
USA -0.17 CY -0.15 HU 0.60 PL 0.67 PL 0.67 HU 0.71 
SE -0.20 PL -0.17 PL 0.50 HU 0.67 HU 0.67 PL 0.60 
GB -0.20 IL -0.17 CZ 0.25 SLO 0.43 CZ 0.50 SLO 0.50 
AUS -0.20 DK -0.17 SLO 0.20 CZ 0.36 PT 0.43 PT 0.43 
CDN -0.20 SLO -0.20 IL 0.11 IL 0.33 SLO 0.33 IL 0.40 
HU -0.22 WD -0.20 DK 0.00 PT 0.33 GB 0.30 CZ 0.33 
NZ -0.25 AT -0.22 SE 0.00 FR 0.29 FR 0.29 FR 0.33 
FR -0.25 NO -0.22 NO 0.00 ES 0.25 ES 0.27 ES 0.30 
PT -0.25 CZ -0.25 USA 0.00 USA 0.20 CY 0.25 CY 0.25 
CY -0.25 HU -0.25 GB 0.00 GB 0.20 IL 0.25 USA 0.25 
IL -0.25 PT -0.25 AUS 0.00 AUS 0.20 ED 0.25 GB 0.20 
LV -0.25 ED -0.25 NZ 0.00 ED 0.20 USA 0.25 AUS 0.20 
WD -0.28 USA -0.25 CDN 0.00 NZ 0.17 AT 0.21 NZ 0.20 
ES -0.29 SE -0.32 WD 0.00 AT 0.13 SE 0.21 AT 0.20 
PL -0.30 AUS -0.33 AT 0.00 SE 0.12 DK 0.21 ED 0.20 
CZ -0.30 NZ -0.33 FR 0.00 NO 0.11 AUS 0.20 CDN 0.14 
AT -0.33 CDN -0.36 ES 0.00 CY 0.11 NZ 0.20 WD 0.14 
SLO -0.33 GB -0.38 PT 0.00 WD 0.10 CDN 0.20 DK 0.11 
ED -0.38 FR -0.44 ED 0.00 DK 0.10 WD 0.19 NO 0.11 
RUS -0.40 RUS -0.60 CY -0.14 CDN 0.00 NO 0.18 SE 0.10 
Average -0.23  -0.25  0.28  0.35  0.38  0.39 
Skand. -0.10  -0.24  0.00  0.11  0.20  0.11 
Others -0.26  -0.25  0.30  0.38  0.41  0.43 
A Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries think that the occupations actually earns usually, from 
what the occupation should earn. This figure is then standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent.  
 
 
The Scandinavian countries also in this analysis stand out somewhat in 1999. For all other occupa-
tions than the chairmen occupation, the Scandinavian median values are quite close to zero in a 
comparative perspective. This means that the salaries the occupations are perceived to earn usually 
seems more or less at a legitimate level in Scandinavia. The clearest example of this is that the 
Scandinavians on the average only wants to increase the perceived salaries of unskilled workers 
32 
 
with 11 %, while the average in the remaining countries is 43 %. The median Russian even wants to 
increase this salary with as much as 150 %.  
A notable difference between Norway and Denmark versus Sweden is seen in the minister column. 
The very low Danish and Norwegian scores of minus 2 % and 8 % could be seen as an effect of the 
high level of political trust in these countries. The somewhat higher Swedish median of minus 20 % 
could be an effect of the economic and political crisis, Sweden faced in the early nineties - some-
thing that Norway and Denmark have not to the same extent faced.  
Concerning the chairmen column the Scandinavian medians are more in line with the other coun-
tries. The Scandinavian countries on average do not stand out from the remaining ones, but this av-
erage hides a big variation between the Swedish median of – 32 % and the Danish – 17 %. In a 
Scandinavian perspective this overall result translates into a quite big dissatisfaction with the 
chairmen’s salaries in 1999 – especially in Sweden. The aversion towards top excess appears in a 
very clear form in table 5 and is restricted to the chairmen occupation. The results thus suggest that 
the wage levels of chairmen are perceived to have increased too far from a country medium wage 
level to be considered just. 
The Scandinavian medians are not the only results of interest. Firstly it is quite clear that even 
though the respondents in general probably take their point of departure in their perception of the 
actual wage level of an occupation, when deciding the just level (Miller 1995); the respondents do 
want the wage levels to change, often quite a lot. Secondly the pattern of median attitudes are quite 
similar: the two best paid occupations – ministers and chairmen – ought to have their wages re-
duced, the doctors salaries are generally seen as just, while the remaining lower paid occupations 
ought to have their salaries increased according to the respondents.  
Thirdly, of course interesting intra-country variations in this pattern exist. Maybe most remarkably 
the Post-Communist respondents are not satisfied with the salaries of general practitioners, but want 
to increase these quite a lot. This could possibly be caused by the low salaries for publicly em-
ployed, including doctors, in these countries. Doctors take a long and hard education and perform a 
crucial task in the society. This would probably lead many to think a quite high salary for this occu-
pation to be fair. Fourthly, although the Post-Communist countries have accepted the transition to 
market economy somewhat (see above), this table clearly indicates a socialist leftover (Kelley & 
Evans 1993; Austen 1999; Austen 2002 and Blanchflower & Freeman 1997). Table 5 show the 
Post-Communist respondents to clearly wish for a more compressed wage structure. Their medians 
indicate that they want to see the minister’s salaries reduced by as much as 40 %, and the chair-
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men’s salaries reduced by as much as 60 %. It is even more outstanding that they want to see pay-
raised for the remaining occupations for more than 100 % in some instances. The Post-Communist 
countries portray great internal variations in patterns though. Table 6 below will replicate the analy-
sis of table 5, without column of skilled factory worker: 
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TABLE 6. Degree of justice in levels of pay for the five occupations of ISSP 2009. Shown are coun-
try medians of these measuresA. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment  
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in 
a factory  
 
CH 0.00 BG 0.00 UA 1.50 UA 1.00 UA 1.00 
NO -0.07 TR 0.00 RUS 0.67 TR 0.75 TR 0.82 
DK -0.11 CY -0.08 H 0.33 HR 0.67 RUS 0.67 
IS -0.11 EE -0.17 IL 0.25 PL 0.67 SLO 0.60 
NZ -0.17 UA -0.20 EE 0.25 H 0.64 HR 0.60 
CY -0.17 IL -0.25 HR 0.25 RUS 0.60 H 0.54 
AUS -0.20 FL -0.25 LV 0.14 BG 0.60 PL 0.50 
EE -0.20 NZ -0.29 TR 0.11 EE 0.60 BG 0.50 
SE -0.25 SLK -0.29 AT 0.00 LV 0.58 PT 0.50 
GB -0.26 HR -0.33 AUS 0.00 SLO 0.56 EE 0.43 
USA -0.28 CZ -0.33 FL 0.00 PT 0.50 LV 0.39 
FIN -0.30 LV -0.33 BG 0.00 SLK 0.43 IL 0.38 
BG -0.33 DK -0.33 SE 0.00 CZ 0.43 FR 0.36 
FL -0.33 PL -0.36 DK 0.00 E 0.38 IS 0.33 
DE -0.33 IS -0.38 FIN 0.00 FR 0.33 SLK 0.33 
FR -0.33 FIN -0.38 IS 0.00 IS 0.32 CZ 0.33 
PT -0.33 SE -0.38 FR 0.00 DE 0.25 E 0.33 
SLO -0.33 NO -0.40 NO 0.00 GB 0.25 DE 0.25 
IL -0.38 E -0.40 NZ 0.00 AT 0.25 AT 0.25 
TR -0.38 GB -0.40 PL 0.00 CY 0.25 GB 0.25 
HR -0.40 CH -0.40 PT 0.00 IL 0.25 CH 0.22 
PL -0.40 PT -0.44 SLK 0.00 FIN 0.25 AUS 0.20 
SLK -0.42 SLO -0.44 USA 0.00 CH 0.25 FL 0.20 
AT -0.44 DE -0.50 SLO 0.00 AUS 0.22 USA 0.20 
E -0.44 FR -0.50 E 0.00 USA 0.20 CY 0.18 
CZ -0.47 H -0.50 CZ 0.00 FL 0.20 NZ 0.17 
H -0.50 AT -0.50 CH 0.00 DK 0.20 FIN 0.10 
RUS -0.50 RUS -0.50 DE 0.00 NZ 0.19 SE 0.09 
LV -0.60 USA -0.60 GB 0.00 NO 0.19 NO 0.09 
UA -0.67 AUS -0.67 CY -0.13 SE 0.19 DK 0.09 
Average -0.32  -0.35  0.11  0.41  0.36 
Skand. -0.14  -0.37  0.00  0.19  0.09 
Others -0.34  -0.35  0.12  0.43  0.39 
A Calculated by for each occupation subtracting, what the respondents in the various countries think that the occupations actually earns usually, from 
what the occupation should earn. This figure is then standardized by dividing, with the usually earns actually statement of the respondent.  
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Table 6 reconfirms the same pattern in Scandinavian attitudes in 2009 as in 1999: The salaries of all 
occupations minus the chairmen-occupation are seen as comparatively speaking very just in Scan-
dinavia (Sweden is also still lagging behind Denmark and Norway concerning the minister-
occupation). The biggest intra-Scandinavian change in the 10 year period is clearly an increased 
degree of dissatisfaction with the chairmen’s salaries, whose Scandinavian average increased from -
0.24 to -0.37. This increase mirrors the general increase in the countries also found with the minis-
ters’ salaries. The Scandinavian countries do not fully follow suit here though.  
The two other Nordic countries in each their ways resemble and dis-resemble the Scandinavian 
countries. The Finnish respondents are more dissatisfied with ministers’ salaries and to a lesser ex-
tent the shop assistants’ salaries, than the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish respondents. The pat-
terns of the remaining occupations are quite similar. The Icelandic pattern is as the Scandinavian 
countries’ for the three first columns. Concerning the two lower paid occupations the Icelandic re-
spondents want significantly bigger wage increases.  
Besides the Nordic results; table 6 reconfirms the general pattern of wishing higher salaries for the 
lower paid occupations, lower salaries for the higher paid occupations and fair salaries for general 
practitioner. Some Post-Communist countries are still among the most extreme in the columns. The 
transitional legacy is thus not becoming legitimate seen by this measure. Countries like USA and 
Australia seems to have experienced an attitudinal effect of the financial crisis in wishing drastically 
lower salaries of chairmen. 
 
4.4 Degree of consensus in attitudes towards pay – the increasingly di-
vided Scandinavians 
The consensus dimension concerns, to what extent the respondents in the different countries agree 
about the measures presented above. Dispersion measures like the standard deviation would nor-
mally be presented together with measures of central tendencies, as table 1-6 above displayed. This 
standard approach was not followed though. The tables above are big tables taking up a lot of space 
and containing a lot of information already. Graphically it was difficult to incorporate the dispersion 
measures in the tables. The tables furthermore already contained a lot of countries and as much as 
six different measures per table. Extra information in the form of dispersion measures could easily 
have led to more confusion instead of clarification.  
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To measure degree of consensus the standard deviation will in general be used. This does not apply  
concerning the levels of pay measures of table 1 and 2.  As it is apparent in table 1 and 2, even if the 
national currency statements have been recalculated to PPP corrected $, there are still quite big dif-
ferences in levels between the countries. Interpreting a standard deviation is relative to which scale, 
the measure of central tendency has. The consequence is that it is not possible to compare the stand-
ard deviations of the countries (the standard deviation can be interpreted as the average distance 
from the average). To give an example; a standard deviation of 1.000 PPP corrected $ is quite small, 
if the median/average is 75.000 PPP corrected $. If the median/average instead is 7.000 PPP cor-
rected $, the standard deviation denotes a significant dispersion of the respondents statements. What 
is needed is therefore a standardised version of the standard deviation, setting the standard deviation 
values relative to the measures of central tendency. The “Coefficient of Variation” (CoV) is exactly 
such a measure, why it is used in these two cases19. If dispersion tables for all measures presented 
above would be present below, six new tables would be needed to be presented. To conserve space, 
the results of these tables will just be presented below (The tables can be found in appendix 7.3-
7.5). 
The tables 11-16 in appendix 7.3-7.5 display a quite remarkable tendency: the degree of consensus 
in the Scandinavian countries generally becomes smaller from 1999 to 2009. Going more into de-
tail, appendix 7.3 shows that especially the Norwegians and Danes disagrees more about, what the 
occupations ought to earn in 2009 than in 1999. The Swedes have only slightly bigger CoV’s in 
2009 than in 1999. This result can be found both by looking at the actual coefficients of the coun-
tries and comparing their position in the tables to those of other countries. Firstly the coefficients on 
average of Denmark and Norway respectively rise significantly from 0.026 and 0.008 to 0.151 and 
0,199. For Norway this means that while the average deviation from the median was approximately 
1 % from the median in 1999, it increased to approximately 20 % in 2009. Secondly especially 
Norway moves from the bottom of the columns in 1999 to the upper-middle of the table. This Nor-
wegian result is furthermore in accordance with the remarkable degree of consensus Osberg & 
Smeeding (2006) found in Norway, albeit with a slightly different measure. 
                                                 
19 The formula for calculating the coefficient of variation is normally: 


VC , because the median is consistently 
used in the article as the measure of central tendency, a slightly modified version of the CoV is also uses here: 
M
CV

  , ( = standard deviation, M= median and  = mean). 
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Appendix 7.4 confirms this tendency even more clearly. In 1999 the Scandinavian countries are in 
general in the bottom of the columns, with very low standard deviations in a comparative perspec-
tive (table 13). The exception is the two first columns for Norway, who is in the very top of the ta-
ble. This drops drastically after excluding the minister-occupation in the third columns though. In 
2009 Denmark, Norway and also Sweden have moved from the bottom of the columns to the mid-
dle of the tables. Most of the standard deviations have also increased quite significantly from below 
0.1 to around 0.2. 
Appendix 7.5 again confirms the tendency. The Scandinavian countries are generally in the lower 
half of the columns in 1999, with standard deviations below 0.025 (table 15). The exception is again 
Norway, who in 1999 has statistics for the chairmen and doctor columns not making any sense, on 
the “proportion-scales”, the measures of the justice dimension operates on. These results thus serve 
as a textbook example of how much outliers can influence average-, and hence standard deviation 
measures. Ignoring these Norwegian results the Scandinavian countries have clearly moved from 
the lower half to the top of the table from 1999-2009. Sweden is again the only country “left be-
hind”, but this time only in the three last columns.  
The two other Nordic countries Iceland and Finland are not as Scandinavian, as measured on some 
of the other dimensions. Iceland in all the 2009-tables displays a very big degree of consensus, not 
mirrored in the Scandinavian countries. Finland is less extreme in this respect, but also a higher 
degree of consensus, than the Scandinavian countries in general. 
Summing up the Scandinavian people clearly disagrees more about the attitudes towards pay in 
2009 than in 1999. This result can be found in all tables of appendix 7.3-7.5, but is of course more 
clear in some than in others.  
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5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was in a two-way comparative perspective to examine if and how the 
Scandinavians’ attitudes towards pay stand out from those inhabited by people in other western 
countries and how the development have been from 1999 to 2009. The analysis of the four opera-
tionalised dimensions of attitudes towards pay – levels of pay, difference in levels of pay, degree of 
justice in levels of pay and consensus – clearly showed that the Scandinavian attitudes of both 1999 
and 2009 were in fact quite exceptional. The thorough 2-way comparative design - that is compara-
tive in both space and time - and in-depth analyses of as many as four dimensions of the concept, 
furthermore contributes to a more complex, but also potentially dynamic, understanding, of how the 
attitudes of the Scandinavians might be expected to develop in the future. This is in contrast to 
much of the existing research in the field. 
The Scandinavian countries most clearly and consistently stood out from the other western coun-
tries, when investigating the dimension of attitudes towards difference in levels of pay: No matter 
which of the three aggregated, or the three disaggregated measures used in 1999 or 2009, the Scan-
dinavians want exceptionally small differences in levels of pay (see table 3 and 4). 
The analyses of the other dimensions furthermore substantiated that this egalitarianism seems like 
an effect of an aversion towards top excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom. In the analyses of 
the dimension of attitudes towards levels of pay, it was thus firstly clear and in time increasingly 
consistent that the Scandinavians want quite low salaries for the higher paid occupations, compared 
to other rich western countries. Contrasting the Anglo-Saxon-, the Continental European- and the 
Post-Communist countries, the Scandinavian countries displayed a rising tendency from left to right 
in both the tables of 1999 and 2009 (see table 1 and 2, appendix 7.1 and 7.2). 
Secondly the aversion towards top excess seemed even clearer in the analyses of the dimension of 
attitudes towards degree of justice in levels of pay. The Scandinavians in general found the salaries 
of the occupations quite just in a comparative perspective. The two lower paid occupations thus 
ought to have their salaries increased by maximum 20 % according to the Scandinavians in both 
1999 and 2009, which in a comparative perspective is very little. The only real exception from this 
pattern was the chairmen occupation. In a Scandinavian perspective the salaries of chairmen in 
2009 are thus wanted reduced with between 33 - 40 % (table 5 and 6).  
39 
 
Summing up, in accordance with Åberg’s (1984) descriptions in the 1980’s, the Scandinavians does 
in fact seem to consistently be exceptionally egalitarian, compared to other western countries in 
1999 and 2009. This egalitarianism furthermore seems clearly to be related to an aversion towards 
to excess, rather than a wish to spoil the bottom. In the analyses of the last dimension: Degree of 
consensus in attitudes towards pay, clear indications was found of cracks in the Scandinavian egali-
tarianism. Although clearer in some tables than in others, a clear tendency for a decreased degree of 
consensus, measures by various dispersion measures, could be seen. In 1999 the Scandinavian 
countries were among those with the lowest standard deviations and coefficients of variance. In 
2009, the Scandinavian countries have crawled upwards to the center or even the top of the tables. 
The Scandinavians are thus clearly more polarised on these issues in 2009 than in 1999. This ten-
dency could indicate a dynamic leading to a change in the Scandinavian egalitarianism in the future 
– in one direction or another.   
A final remark about the choice of focus is also in order. The two other Nordic countries Iceland 
and Finland are both present in the 2009-dataset. Often the Scandinavian countries are not in them-
selves a focus of analysis in the social sciences. Instead the Nordic countries and the Nordic model 
are often described as being special (e.g. Ervasti et al 2008). In spite of this, the result showed that 
the Scandinavian or maybe “core-Nordic” attitudes towards pay clearly deviated from those of the 
Finnish and Icelandic respondents.  
The Icelandic attitudes in several aspects actually resemble the Scandinavian. This is not the case 
when looking at the level of consensus and justice though. The Icelanders thus remain having a very 
high degree of consensus also in 2009. On the other hand a much bigger dissatisfaction, than the 
Scandinavian countries’, with the salaries of the lower paid occupation, could be seen in table 6. 
The Finnish attitudes were even less similar to the Scandinavian. Only in the analysis of the justice 
dimension did the Finnish in general resemble the Scandinavians. The Finnish attitudes in fact more 
clearly resembles those of Continental European countries Austria and Germany, than the Scandi-
navian ones.  
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1. Other measures of attitudes towards levels of pay in 1999 – gross 
salaries and Euros  
 
TABLE 7. Attitudes to yearly gross payA for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country me-
dians in PPP corrected $B. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in a 
factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker 
in a factory  
 
FR 81.378 FR 135.630 USA 100.000 USA 35.500 NO 28.245 NO 26.900 
AUS 77.942 CDN 121.951 CDN 84.104 CDN 35.324 DK 25.940 CDN 25.231 
AT 76.499 GB 115.207 AUS 77.942 NO 33.625 CDN 25.231 USA 25.000 
USA 75.000 USA 100.000 FR 67.815 AUS 31.177 USA 25.000 DK 24.761 
WD 74.664 WD 93.330 NO 67.249 DK 29.478 AUS 23.383 FR 21.701 
GB 72.197 IL 82.306 WD 62.220 WD 27.999 WD 21.777 ES 19.505 
CDN 63.078 AUS 77.942 GB 61.444 GB 27.650 FR 21.701 AUS 19.456 
ED 62.220 SL 76.936 DK 58.955 FR 27.126 ES 19.505 AT 19.125 
IL 61.069 AT 76.499 AT 57.375 ED 24.888 AT 19.125 WD 18.666 
DK 58.955 NO 67.249 NZ 52.356 ES 24.706 ED 18.666 SS 18.587 
SL 57.702 NZ 65.445 ED 49.776 AT 23.906 SE 18.587 GB 18.433 
PT 57.373 ED 62.220 IL 40.713 NZ 22.906 GB 18.433 NZ 16.361 
NO 53.800 PT 57.343 SE 37.175 SE 22.615 IL 18.321 IL 16.285 
NZ 52.356 DK 56.597 SL 38.468 IL 20.356 SL 17.311 ED 15.555 
ES 52.012 ES 52.012 PT 34.406 SLO 17.311 NZ 16.361 SL 13.464 
PL 46.452 PL 46.452 ES 33.808 PT 17.203 PT 13.762 PT 11.469 
SE  43.371 SE 43.371 PL 23.226 PL 13.936 PL 9.290 PL 9.290 
CZ 37.686 CZ 41.873 HU 17.845 CZ 10.887 CZ 8.375 HU 7.138 
HU 35.691 HU 35.691 CZ 16.749 HU 9.518 HU 8.328 CZ 6.700 
A The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The 
remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is un-
specified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remain-
ing countries have asked about gross salaries.   
B The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates 
are defined as: “National currency per current international dollar”, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements 
with the current PPP-conversion rate. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
44 
 
For the following countries preliminary recalculations from local currency to Euro have been made – followed by another recalculation to PPP-
corrected $: France, Portugal, Spain, West- and East Germany, Austria and Slovenia. The reason is, that the PPP-conversion rates for these countries 
prescribes that the local currency is Euro also in 1999. 
The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked 
to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-
profiles/social-inequality/1999/ ). 
 
TABLE 8. Attitudes to yearly net payA for six occupations in ISSP 1999. Shown are country medi-
ans in EurosB. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in a 
factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker 
in a factory  
 
FR 54.878 FR 91.463 USA 63.571 USA 22.568 NO 16.436 USA 15.893 
GB 48.948 GB 78.108 FR 45.732 NO 19.567 DK 16.484 DK 15.734 
AT 48.167 USA 63.571 GB 41.657 GB 18.746 USA 15.893 NO 15.653 
USA 47.678 CDN 59.987 CDN 41.370 DK 18.731 FR 14.634 FR 14.634 
IL 43.413 WD 52.163 NO 39.134 FR 18.293 IL 13.024 SE 12.592 
CY 41.797 AT 48.167 AUS 38.776 CDN 17.376 SE 12.592 GB 12.497 
WD 41.731 IL 43.413 DK 37.463 WD 15.649 GB 12.497 CDN 12.411 
AUS 38.776 NO 39.134 AT 36.126 AUS 15.511 CDN 12.411 AT 12.042 
DK 37.463 AUS 38.776 WD 34.776 SE 15.320 WD 12.171 IL 11.577 
ED 34.776 NZ 36.452 NZ 29.161 AT 15.052 AT 12.042 ES 10.818 
NO 31.307 DK 35.964 IL 28.942 IL 14.471 AUS 11.633 WD 10.433 
CDN 31.028 ED 34.776 ED 27.820 ED 13.910 ES 10.818 CY 9.718 
PT 29.928 PT 29.928 CY 27.168 ES 13.703 ED 10.433 AUS 9.694 
SE 29.381 SE 29.381 SE 25.184 NZ 12.758 CY 9.404 NZ 9.113 
NZ 29.161 ES 28.848 ES 18.751 CY 12.539 NZ 9.113 ED 8.694 
ES 28.848 CY 27.168 PT 17.957 PT 8.978 PT 7.183 PT 5.986 
SL 18.622 SL 24.829 SL 12.414 SL 5.587 SL 5.587 SL 4.345 
PL 15.130 PL 15.130 PL 7.565 PL 4.539 PL 3.026 PL 3.026 
CZ 11.418 CZ 12.687 CZ 5.075 LV 3.610 LV 2.707 CZ 2.030 
HU 9.303 LV 12.633 HU 4.652 CZ 3.299 CZ 2.537 HU 1.861 
LV 9.024 HU 9.303 LV 3.610 HU 2.481 HU 2.171 LV 1.805 
RUS 4.844 RUS 4.844 BG 3.072 BG 1.843 BG 1.228 BG 1.229 
BG 4.300 BG 3.686 RUS 1.453 RUS 1.453 RUS 727 RUS 484 
A The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, USA, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The 
remaining countries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about net salaries: Slovenia, Israel, Spain, Latvia, France and Portugal. In Poland, Bulgaria and Russia it is un-
specified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in these countries are assumed as net salaries. The remain-
ing countries have asked about gross salaries.   
The Australian, Slovenian, Spanish and Portuguese statements have furthermore been multiplied with 1000, while the respondents here where asked 
to answer in whole thousands of their local currency (cf. the national questionnaires downloadable at: http://www.gesis.org/issp/issp-modules-
profiles/social-inequality/1999/ ). 
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7.2. Other measures of attitudes towards levels of pay in 2009 – gross 
salaries and Euros  
 
TABLE 9. Attitudes to yearly gross payAfor the five occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country 
medians in PPP corrected $B. 
a cabinet minister in the 
<national> government  
 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general practice 
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in a 
factory  
CH 167.280 AUS 204.360 USA 150.000 CH 37.638 FL 35.037 
CY 128.859 USA 200.000 CY 128.859 DK 35.465 CH 33.456 
DE 112.676 CH 167.280 AUS 122.616 FL 35.037 DK 33.101 
FR 109.344 FR 182.240 GB 102.134 NO 31.723 NO 31.723 
AUS 102.180 GB 152.439 CH 100.368 USA 30.000 USA 30.000 
USA 100.000 DE 140.845 FR 91.120 IS 29.197 IS 29.197 
FL 93.432 FI 125.261 DE 84.507 FR 29.158 SE 28.454 
GB 91.463 FL 113.286 DK 82.752 DE 28.169 FR 27.336 
NZ 91.218 AT 112.808 FL 81.753 AUS 27.248 AUS 27.248 
DK 88.663 SL 112.015 NZ 80.396 SE 27.161 ES 25.066 
AT 84.606 NZ 98.949 NO 74.019 AT 25.382 FI 25.052 
SL 84.011 PT 89.126 AT 70.505 SL 25.203 GB 24.390 
PL 81.338 PL 81.338 SL 70.009 FI 25.052 IL 23.354 
IS 77.858 CY 80.537 IS 68.126 GB 24.390 AT 22.914 
IL 77.848 NO 79.306 FI 62.630 IL 23.354 DE 22.535 
FI 75.157 IS 77.858 SE 58.202 ES 23.138 SL 22.403 
NO 74.019 IL 77.848 PT 55.704 NZ 21.645 NZ 21.645 
HU 67.661 ES 77.127 IL 50.601 PT 17.825 CY 19.329 
PT 66.844 EE 72.523 ES 48.204 PL 16.268 PT 16.711 
SE 64.669 HU 67.661 PL 40.669 EE 16.116 PL 16.268 
EE 64.464 SE 64.669 TR 35.447 CY 16.107 EE 16.116 
ES 57.845 DK 59.109 CZ 33.487 TR 14.179 TR 14.179 
TR 56.715 CZ 50.230 EE 32.232 SK 13.796 SK 13.796 
SK 55.167 SK 45.987 HU 29.602 HU 12.686 HU 12.686 
CZ 41.859 TR 42.536 SK 27.592 CZ 12.558 CZ 12.558 
BG 25.210 BG 31.933 BG 20.168 BG 8.403 BG 8.403 
A The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining coun-
tries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
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The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in 
these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.   
B The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates 
are defined as: “National currency per current international dollar”, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements 
with the current PPP-conversion rate. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
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TABLE 10. Attitudes to yearly net payA for six occupations in ISSP 2009. Shown are country medi-
ans in EurosB. 
a cabinet minister in the 
<national> government  
 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general practice 
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in a 
factory  
 
CH 161.355 CH 161.355 CH 96.813 CH 36.305 CH 32.271 
FR 72.000 FR 120.000 USA 83.546 DK 24.351 DK 22.727 
DK 60.877 AUS 118.407 AUS 71.044 NO 22.035 NO 22.035 
AUS 59.203 USA 111.395 FR 60.000 FR 19.200 SE 18.164 
DE 56.333 FI 85.140 DK 56.818 FL 18.000 FR 18.000 
USA 55.697 GB 77.700 GB 52.059 SE 17.338 FL 18.000 
NO 51.415 DE 70.416 NO 51.415 FI 17.028 FI 17.028 
FI 51.084 AT 64.675 NZ 44.642 USA 16.709 USA 16.709 
NZ 50.652 FL 58.200 FI 42.570 IS 16.271 IS 16.271 
AT 48.506 NO 55.080 DE 42.250 AUS 15.788 AUS 15.788 
FL 48.000 NZ 54.944 FL 42.000 AT 14.552 ES 15.600 
GB 46.620 PT 48.000 AT 40.422 ES 14.400 IL 13.639 
IL 45.462 SL 48.000 IS 37.967 DE 14.083 AT 13.137 
IS 43.390 ES 48.000 SE 37.154 IL 13.639 GB 12.432 
SE 41.282 IL 45.462 ES 30.000 GB 12.432 NZ 12.019 
SL 36.000 IS 43.390 SL 30.000 NZ 12.019 DE 11.267 
ES 36.000 SE 41.282 PT 30.000 SL 10.800 SL 9.600 
PT 36.000 DK 40.584 IL 29.550 PT 9.600 PT 9.000 
EE 30.678 EE 34.513 HR 16.361 EE 7.669 EE 7.669 
PL 28.820 PL 28.820 EE 15.339 HR 6.544 HR 6.544 
SK 23.892 HR 24.541 PL 14.410 SK 5.975 SK 5.975 
TR 22.451 HU 22.510 TR 14.032 LV 5.930 LV 5.930 
HU 22.510 CZ 20.858 CZ 13.905 PL 5.764 PL 5.764 
RUS 20.618 RUS 20.618 SK 11.950 TR 5.613 TR 5.613 
CZ 17.382 SK 19.916 LV 10.165 CZ 5.214 CZ 5.214 
LV 16.942 LV 16.942 HU 9.848 RUS 4.418 RUS 4.418 
HR 16.361 TR 16.838 RUS 5.891 HU 4.221 HU 4.221 
UA 7.847 UA 8.968 UA 3.363 UA 2.242 UA 2.242 
A The following countries have asked about yearly salaries: Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The remaining coun-
tries have asked about monthly salaries. The recalculation to yearly salaries for these has been made by multiplying with 12. 
The following countries have asked about gross salaries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom. In Spain it is unspecified whether the respondents should think about gross or net salaries. The statements in 
these countries are assumed as net salaries, while this was specified in 1999. The remaining countries have asked about net salaries.   
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B The PPP-conversion rates for the years 1999 and 2009 have been subtracted from the 2010 version of World Economic Outlook. Because the rates 
are defined as: “National currency per current international dollar”, the recalculations have been made by dividing the national currency statements 
with the current PPP-conversion rate. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx. 
 
7.3. Degree of consensus apparent in the measures for the different oc-
cupations of attitudes towards levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. 
Shown are Coefficients of Variation. 
TABLE 11. Coefficients of Variations for the statements of the salary of six occupations net yearly 
salary in PPP corrected $ in ISSP 1999. 
a cabinet minister 
in the <national> 
government 
a chairman of a 
large national 
corporation  
a doctor in 
general practice  
 
A skilled worker 
in a factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled 
worker in a 
factory  
Country averages 
RUS 0.102 RUS 0.159 PL 0.055 PL 0.036 CDN 0.055 GB 0.067 RUS 0.062 
PL 0.098 CDN 0.110 BG 0.052 BG 0.033 PT 0.041 FR 0.055 PL 0.060 
BG 0.093 PL 0.098 PT 0.043 RUS 0.032 PL 0.036 RUS 0.042 CDN 0.048 
LV 0.074 HU 0.090 RUS 0.037 IL 0.024 RUS 0.035 LV 0.040 BG 0.046 
NZ 0.067 LV 0.079 CDN 0.034 SL 0.021 IL 0.032 PL 0.037 LV 0.042 
CDN 0.045 ED 0.060 DK 0.032 USA 0.019 BG 0.030 CDN 0.028 HU 0.037 
HU 0.041 GB 0.054 HU 0.031 FR 0.018 SL 0.024 IL 0.027 PT 0.034 
DK 0.039 USA 0.051 LV 0.031 HU 0.018 FR 0.024 CY 0.027 GB 0.034 
ED 0.038 PT 0.050 ED 0.029 CDN 0.016 HU 0.021 BG 0.023 FR 0.033 
PT 0.038 NZ 0.047 AT 0.028 LV 0.016 USA 0.021 USA 0.023 NZ 0.031 
FR 0.031 SE 0.045 USA 0.026 PT 0.015 DK 0.019 SL 0.020 ED 0.029 
GB 0.028 FR 0.043 FR 0.025 GB 0.013 GB 0.018 HU 0.019 USA 0.028 
USA 0.027 BG 0.042 WD 0.025 ED 0.013 CY 0.017 PT 0.018 DK 0.026 
SL 0.026 WD 0.041 NZ 0.024 WD 0.013 NZ 0.016 NZ 0.017 SL 0.024 
WD 0.023 DK 0.040 GB 0.023 NZ 0.012 ES 0.016 ED 0.016 IL 0.022 
AT 0.020 AT 0.037 SL 0.022 CY 0.011 SE 0.016 DK 0.016 WD 0.021 
IL 0.019 SL 0.029 CY 0.019 DK 0.010 ED 0.015 ES 0.015 AT 0.019 
SE 0.017 IL 0.028 IL 0.018 AT 0.009 CZ 0.015 CZ 0.015 SE 0.019 
CZ 0.017 AUS 0.026 CZ 0.015 ES 0.008 LV 0.014 SE 0.014 CY 0.018 
ES 0.015 CZ 0.023 SE 0.013 SE 0.008 WD 0.010 WD 0.012 CZ 0.015 
AUS 0.014 CY 0.023 AUS 0.012 CZ 0.007 AT 0.009 AT 0.009 ES 0.014 
CY 0.012 ES 0.015 ES 0.012 NO 0.007 NO 0.007 NO 0.008 AUS 0.012 
NO 0.010 NO 0.008 NO 0.008 AUS 0.006 AUS 0.007 AUS 0.007 NO 0.008 
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TABLE 12. Coefficients of Variations for the statements of the salary of six occupations net yearly 
salary in PPP corrected $ in ISSP 2009. 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> 
government  
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in 
a factory  
 
Country averages 
USA 0,271 CH 0,573 USA 0,391 PL 0,302 DE 3,601 DE 0,862 
GB 0,253 USA 0,554 NO 0,222 NO 0,253 PL 0,279 USA 0,295 
NO 0,158 DE 0,541 PL 0,177 PT 0,236 PT 0,271 PL 0,204 
PT 0,119 FL 0,248 PT 0,158 USA 0,233 GB 0,245 NO 0,199 
DK 0,123 GB 0,241 GB 0,151 AUS 0,196 NO 0,216 GB 0,194 
PL 0,107 DK 0,181 DK 0,146 DK 0,103 DK 0,203 PT 0,186 
DE 0,081 PL 0,155 DE 0,057 GB 0,079 AUS 0,202 DK 0,151 
RUS 0,071 NO 0,148 AUS 0,057 ES 0,032 UA 0,038 CH 0,137 
CH 0,067 FR 0,148 HU 0,043 DE 0,030 ES 0,027 AUS 0,116 
AUS 0,060 PT 0,144 FL 0,043 FI 0,026 LV 0,026 FL 0,072 
ES 0,057 UA 0,140 ES 0,040 IL 0,025 RUS 0,026 UA 0,055 
FL 0,053 LV 0,081 NZ 0,038 RUS 0,024 USA 0,026 FR 0,053 
LV 0,046 SE 0,079 UA 0,034 UA 0,024 TR 0,025 RUS 0,045 
FR 0,041 NZ 0,073 AT 0,034 FR 0,024 FR 0,020 ES 0,040 
HU 0,041 RUS 0,071 RUS 0,034 EE 0,022 FI 0,017 LV 0,040 
AT 0,039 AUS 0,066 FR 0,032 TR 0,020 SL 0,017 NZ 0,033 
UA 0,039 AT 0,061 SL 0,031 CZ 0,018 EE 0,017 FI 0,032 
FI 0,035 EE 0,058 EE 0,031 LV 0,017 HU 0,015 AT 0,031 
NZ 0,034 IS 0,057 LV 0,031 HU 0,015 SE 0,012 HU 0,030 
CZ 0,029 TR 0,056 FI 0,027 SL 0,013 AT 0,011 EE 0,030 
TR 0,026 FI 0,055 CH 0,026 IS 0,012 NZ 0,011 TR 0,029 
SE 0,024 ES 0,045 SE 0,021 SE 0,011 IS 0,010 SE 0,029 
SL 0,024 IL 0,042 TR 0,020 NZ 0,011 SK 0,010 SL 0,023 
SK 0,021 HU 0,036 IL 0,020 AT 0,010 IL 0,010 IL 0,023 
EE 0,020 SK 0,035 IS 0,018 CH 0,010 HR 0,009 IS 0,023 
IS 0,019 SL 0,031 SK 0,015 FL 0,010 FL 0,008 CZ 0,020 
HR 0,018 CZ 0,030 CZ 0,014 SK 0,009 CZ 0,008 SK 0,018 
IL 0,016 HR 0,026 HR 0,011 HR 0,008 CH 0,007 HR 0,014 
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7.4. Degree of consensus apparent in the various measures of attitudes 
towards difference in levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are 
standard deviations. 
TABLE 13. Degree of consensus apparent in the six different measures of attitudes towards differ-
ence in levels of pay in ISSP 1999. Shown are standard deviations.  
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
DHigh paid occ. 
Vs. Skilled worker 
EChairmen vs. 
Skilled worker 
F Skilled worker 
vs. Low paid occ. 
NO 0.432 RUS 0.744 RUS 0.967 NO 0.636 RUS 0.429 RUS 0.035
RUS 0.390 NO 0.637 CDN 0.426 RUS 0.312 CDN 0.286 BG 0.030
PL 0.218 PL 0.302 GB 0.414 NZ 0.242 PL 0.273 USA 0.030
GB 0.208 GB 0.254 LV 0.413 PL 0.217 HU 0.239 IL 0.027
LV 0.174 LV 0.253 PL 0.396 USA 0.195 GB 0.230 WD 0.020
CDN 0.171 CDN 0.236 HU 0.343 CDN 0.158 LV 0.230 LV 0.019
USA 0.159 HU 0.207 FR 0.255 GB 0.146 FR 0.205 SLO 0.018
PT 0.158 USA 0.203 PT 0.245 HU 0.146 SL 0.166 GB 0.018
HU 0.144 PT 0.183 USA 0.242 LV 0.145 PT 0.158 FR 0.016
FR 0.111 FR 0.157 ED 0.195 FR 0.128 NZ 0.155 PT 0.016
NZ 0.107 ED 0.134 WD 0.188 SL 0.119 ED 0.149 PL 0.015
ED 0.101 WD 0.124 NZ 0.186 PT 0.111 US 0.148 CY 0.015
WD 0.100 NZ 0.121 AT 0.157 ED 0.103 WD 0.139 CDN 0.015
AT 0.092 AT 0.109 SL 0.144 BG 0.100 BG 0.133 ED 0.014
SL 0.073 SL 0.102 CZ 0.136 WD 0.092 AT 0.119 HU 0.013
CZ 0.067 CZ 0.094 IL 0.105 AT 0.082 CZ 0.094 ES 0.011
BG 0.061 BG 0.074 SE 0.103 CZ 0.065 IL 0.091 NZ 0.010
IL 0.055 IL 0.072 AUS 0.099 IL 0.061 SE 0.081 DK 0.010
DK 0.055 AUS 0.067 BG 0.086 DK 0.057 AUS 0.073 CZ 0.009
AUS 0.054 DK 0.063 DK 0.083 AUS 0.050 DK 0.071 AT 0.009
CY 0.046 SE 0.061 CY 0.064 SE 0.048 CY 0.049 AUS 0.008
SE 0.045 CY 0.050 ES 0.050 CY 0.038 ES 0.036 NO 0.007
ES 0.037 ES 0.047 NO 0.032 ES 0.035 NO 0.026 SE 0.005
A The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in 
the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop 
assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second. 
B This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.  
D The index of the fourth column is constructed by dividing the index of the average statements of the top occupations, with the statement of a skilled 
factory worker. 
EThis index taps the chairmen skilled worker wage ratio. 
FThis index is the ratio of a skilled worker to the average of the two low paid occupations – shop assistant and unskilled worker in a factory.  
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TABLE 14. Degree of consensus apparent in the three different measures of attitudes towards dif-
ference in levels of pay in ISSP 2009. Shown are standard deviations.  
AWage dispersion 
index 
BHigh- vs. Low 
paid occ. 
CChairmen vs. Low 
paid occ. 
USA 56.13 GB 8.658 GB 16.89
GB 7.970 AUS 2.260 USA 3.889
AUS 2.021 USA 2.107 AUS 3.689
DE 1.264 DE 1.900 DE 3.649
CH 0.734 CH 1.077 CH 1.961
FR 0.325 FR 0.481 FR 0.914
PT 0.322 FL 0.451 FL 0.830
FL 0.309 PT 0.436 PT 0.763
PL 0.254 PL 0.368 PL 0.586
DK 0.204 UA 0.266 UA 0.449
NO 0.183 RUS 0.252 NZ 0.384
UA 0.181 DK 0.232 DK 0.326
NZ 0.180 NZ 0.231 RUS 0.319
RUS 0.170 AT 0.182 FI 0.290
AT 0.137 FI 0.178 AT 0.279
FI 0.128 HU 0.171 EE 0.223
HU 0.125 NO 0.162 NO 0.195
EE 0.095 EE 0.132 LV 0.194
LV 0.090 LV 0.128 HU 0.185
SL 0.083 TR 0.106 SE 0.180
TR 0.077 SE 0.101 IL 0.164
BG 0.076 CZ 0.099 TR 0.154
IL 0.073 ES 0.099 IS 0.141
SE 0.072 SL 0.098 SL 0.135
CZ 0.071 BG 0.095 BG 0.128
ES 0.068 IL 0.094 ES 0.127
SK 0.065 SK 0.089 CZ 0.124
IS 0.062 IS 0.085 SK 0.119
CY 0.060 HR 0.061 HR 0.095
HR 0.044 CY 0.061 CY 0.049
A The wage dispersion index is calculated by summerising the statements for the three occupations: chairman of a big national company, minister in 
the national government and general practitioner and afterwards dividing this figure by three. Hereafter the statements of the two occupations: shop 
assistant and unskilled factory worker is summerised and afterwards this figure is divided by two. Lastly first index is then divided by the second. 
B This index is calculated the same way as the wage dispersion index, but the occupation general practitioner is withdrawn from the top group. 
CIn the index of the third column the occupation minister in the national government is also withdrawn in the same way.  
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7.5. Degree of consensus apparent in the various measures of attitudes 
towards degree of justice in levels of pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown 
are standard deviations. 
TABLE 15. Degree of consensus apparent in the degree of justice measures for six occupations of 
ISSP 1999. Shown are standard deviations.  
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment 
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
A skilled worker in a 
factory  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker 
in a factory  
 
PL 0.106 NO 153.3 NO 191.6 RUS 0.188 PT 0.096 RUS 0.155 
RUS 0.071 RUS 0.142 USA 2.068 BG 0.072 RUS 0.092 FR 0.101 
PT 0.071 PL 0.137 PT 0.334 PT 0.059 BG 0.070 BG 0.066 
USA 0.059 IL 0.093 RUS 0.289 USA 0.041 CDN 0.061 LV 0.066 
NZ 0.057 PT 0.058 BG 0.160 PL 0.040 PL 0.055 PL 0.054 
LV 0.040 BG 0.057 PL 0.082 LV 0.039 HU 0.050 GB 0.053 
HU 0.039 USA 0.048 LV 0.076 SL 0.038 IL 0.040 PT 0.052 
ES 0.036 NZ 0.046 HU 0.049 IL 0.031 USA 0.040 SL 0.047 
BG 0.038 LV 0.041 GB 0.049 HU 0.031 LV 0.039 USA 0.046 
FR 0.030 HU 0.034 IL 0.029 DK 0.025 SL 0.035 HU 0.042 
ED 0.027 GB 0.031 CDN 0.025 NO 0.023 GB 0.034 CDN 0.038 
CDN 0.025 CDN 0.027 AT 0.023 FR 0.022 ES 0.026 IL 0.032 
IL 0.025 ES 0.021 SL 0.021 WD 0.021 FR 0.026 CY 0.031 
WD 0.021 FR 0.021 FR 0.021 ES 0.018 CZ 0.023 ES 0.028 
SL 0.018 SL 0.020 ED 0.018 ED 0.015 CY 0.020 CZ 0.025 
AT 0.017 SE 0.019 DK 0.018 NZ 0.014 ED 0.019 DK 0.019 
GB 0.016 AT 0.019 CZ 0.016 GB 0.014 NZ 0.018 ED 0.017 
SE 0.016 DK 0.017 NZ 0.014 CY 0.012 SE 0.013 SE 0.015 
DK 0.014 CY 0.017 WD 0.014 CDN 0.011 NO 0.012 NZ 0.013 
AUS 0.013 ED 0.016 ES 0.013 CZ 0.011 WD 0.012 WD 0.011 
NO 0.012 CZ 0.015 AUS 0.009 AT 0.009 DK 0.010 AT 0.010 
CY 0.011 WD 0.014 CY 0.009 AUS 0.008 AT 0.009 NO 0.009 
CZ 0.009 AUS 0.013 SE 0.009 SE 0.007 AUS 0.008 AUS 0.008 
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TABLE 16. Degree of consensus apparent in the degree of justice measures for the five occupa-
tions of ISSP 2009. Shown are standard deviations.  
 
 
 
a cabinet minister in 
the <national> gov-
ernment  
a chairman of a large 
national corporation  
 
a doctor in general 
practice  
 
a shop assistant  
 
an unskilled worker in 
a factory  
 
GB 0.749 USA 364.7 GB 2.126 AUS 38.64 DE 5.938 
NO 0.672 DE 0.860 USA 1.568 GB 1.239 USA 4.245 
SE 0.656 NO 0.723 NO 1.038 NO 1.095 GB 1.244 
PL 0.111 DK 0.638 UA 0.109 DE 0.406 NO 1.220 
PT 0.063 NZ 0.135 TR 0.096 USA 0.352 AUS 0.778 
NZ 0.054 FR 0.134 HU 0.078 PT 0.331 PT 0.420 
UA 0.046 GB 0.072 RUS 0.051 RUS 0.050 DK 0.067 
DK 0.044 SE 0.053 BG 0.044 UA 0.048 UA 0.064 
RUS 0.034 RUS 0.039 DK 0.043 PL 0.036 EE 0.048 
SL 0.032 UA 0.037 PT 0.040 EE 0.035 RUS 0.042 
USA 0.030 EE 0.035 EE 0.038 BG 0.035 SL 0.034 
ES 0.028 IL 0.031 NZ 0.036 TR 0.035 LV 0.030 
TR 0.028 PL 0.028 LV 0.031 HU 0.033 BG 0.029 
DE 0.027 BG 0.028 PL 0.030 DK 0.033 TR 0.027 
HU 0.026 LV 0.028 AUS 0.029 FI 0.031 HU 0.027 
EE 0.025 TR 0.026 IL 0.027 LV 0.028 FI 0.027 
BG 0.025 ES 0.023 FI 0.021 CZ 0.027 PL 0.024 
AUS 0.024 SK 0.021 FR 0.021 IL 0.026 FR 0.023 
FI 0.022 PT 0.021 ES 0.020 SL 0.026 SK 0.021 
IL 0.022 CH 0.020 SL 0.019 ES 0.025 ES 0.020 
AT 0.021 FI 0.020 SE 0.019 FR 0.022 SE 0.018 
IS 0.020 FL 0.019 IS 0.018 SE 0.020 CZ 0.016 
CH 0.018 AUS 0.018 AT 0.018 HR 0.016 HR 0.016 
LV 0.018 HU 0.018 FL 0.018 SK 0.013 IL 0.016 
CZ 0.017 CZ 0.017 CZ 0.017 NZ 0.013 IS 0.014 
FL 0.014 IS 0.015 DE 0.014 IS 0.012 NZ 0.013 
FR 0.014 AT 0.015 HR 0.014 CH 0.012 AT 0.009 
CY 0.011 SL 0.014 SK 0.014 AT 0.010 FL 0.009 
SK 0.011 HR 0.013 CH 0.013 FL 0.010 CH 0.008 
HR 0.009 CY 0.004 CY 0.005 CY 0.009 CY 0.007 
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7.6. List of country abbreviations used in the various tables  
 
GB United Kingdom EE Estonia 
NO Norway BG Bulgaria 
SE Sweden AUS Australia 
PL Poland FI Finland 
PT Portugal IL Israel 
NZ New Zealand AT Austria 
UA Ukraine IS Iceland 
DK Denmark CH Switzerland 
RUS Russia LV Latvia 
SL Slovenia CZ Czech Republic 
USA United States of America FL Flanders 
ES Spain FR France 
TR Turkey CY Cyprus 
DE Germany SK Slovak Republic 
ED East Germany HR Croatia 
WD West Germany HU Hungary 
CDN Canada   
 
 
 
